The Syrian revolution played out in different stages that, while appearing connected in their causes, were in fact distinct in their planning, direction, interaction and outcome. It is hard to connect those first peaceful protests against the corrupt and tyrannical regime of Bashar al-Assad with those who later took up arms under the banner of revolution.
The revolt against the Syrian regime was well deserved. Syrians had known the template of democracy before the string of military coups, the last of which brought Hafez al-Assad to power. A country which had possessed a vitality of trade, culture and openness to the world was thrown into the most severe forms of physical oppression and moral coercion. Corruption seeped through the ranks. The many were neglected in favour of the few, whose interests were placed ahead of those of ordinary people.
People demonstrating for freedom, social justice, human dignity and authentic citizenship captured the hearts of supporters around the world. But the regime met the first phase of the popular revolution with merciless bullets. The equation changed as some revolutionaries felt compelled to take up arms against an authority drenched in death and destruction. Opinions shifted as the revolution became a civil war, and then a regional, and then an international, conflict.
Questions abounded: Were the gunmen terrorists or opposition members? Did they stand for freedom or a new dictatorship? Were they patriots or traitors? Who was behind them? Which should be put first, democracy or the territorial integrity of Syria. Answers to these questions came as fluctuations in Arab positions, from support for the revolution and pressuring Assad to reform, to backing the regime. This culminated in Syria’s return to the Arab League in May 2023 and the resumption of diplomatic ties with some countries that had cut Syria off.
Major change has occurred in the other Arab countries since the spate of uprisings that started in 2009-10. Tunisia has returned to one-man rule; the army seizing back power in Egypt; civil war in Libya and Sudan; Yemen divided, with the north under fundamentalist rule. This upheaval opened pathways for official Arab approaches to Syria to transmute into what we see today.
Three factors need to be taken into account to understand how official Arab attitudes to Syria changed in the last 15 years.
1. The ability of armed jihadist groups to carve out territory and establish the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which persisted for a limited period on Syrian and Iraqi territory.
2. The participation of regional powers in the conflict.
3. The threat to the unity and sovereignty of Syria.
While ISIS is now a thing of the past, the second and third factors remain very pertinent.
Faced with the threat of its destruction, the Assad regime sought help from Iran which paved the way for Hezbollah, the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) and Shia Muslim fighters from other countries to take arms against the Sunni Muslim jihadis. This added a sectarian component to what had been a political and security confrontation. Türkiye entered the fray and carved out part of northern Syria and sponsored affiliated groups there. Gulf countries financed anti-regime militias according to their own calculations about their strategic interests and traditional roles in the region. Israel regarded Syria as a theatre to confront Iran, and the conflict spilled over from the regional to the international with Russia’s alliance with Assad and the United States standing alongside the opposition. Both Moscow and Washington established military bases on Syrian soil.
After years of fighting between 2012 and 2017, Syria was divided into four regions, the largest being held by the ruling regime. The Kurdish region in the north-east was defended by a militia that controlled its area of influence. Türkiye strengthened its presence near its borders in the north-west, in alliance with the jihadist group and al-Qaeda descendant called al-Nusra Front, later renamed the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or Organisation for the Liberation of Syria. This is the group that returned to attack regime-held areas immediately after the ceasefire deal between Lebanon and Israel a little over a week ago on 27 November.
As the confrontation redraws the map of Syria, international political positions have been re-engineered base on three further factors: the return of the Syrian regime to the Arab fold; the conflicting interests of the Syrian population, which has suffered from the scourge of killing, destruction and displacement, with some seeking refuge under the protection of the regime and others afraid of the return of the same regime, the armed groups focused on the idea of an “alternative” homeland, and the Kurds who have long sought to create a wedge into their putative state distributed over Syria, Iran, Iraq and Türkiye; finally there are the repercussions of the Aqsa Flood conflict continuing in Gaza.
Events in Gaza, and the results of Hezbollah’s support front in Lebanon, have raised new questions about the Syrian theatre that have naturally occupied the minds of observers and analysts, as well as official circles across the Arab world and Israel, and beyond that (or perhaps primarily) in the United States.
Timing of the Attack
The central question concerns the timing of the armed factions’ attack on Aleppo and vanquishing of government control of Syria’s industrial capital, before going on to seize Hama. Was the offensive specifically intended to sever the connection between the Assad regime and the Lebanese resistance (Hezbollah)? And to prevent the influx of al-Hashd al-Shaabi from Iraq in the event of an Israeli invasion of Syria? Or did the factions just hit the right time to launch operations, with the understanding that Hezbollah – which had been able to defeat them in previous battles on Syrian soil – would not be able to play such a decisive role after its conflict with Israel? Some observers have suggested an alliance between Israel and the Syrian factions. Others have pointed the finger of blame at Türkiye after the faltering of its rapprochement with Assad and in the hope of ending the burden of the Syrian crisis upon it.
Factional leaders and representatives have been quizzed on their positions regarding Israel, the Gaza war, and whether their offensive would lead to tightening the noose on the Resistance in Lebanon. Also whether they intend to avenge themselves against Hezbollah as a priority and what the implications are regarding coordination with Israel. Or are they interested in liberating the Golan Heights (occupied by Israel) if that were possible? And what is their stance regarding Israeli splits between those who see their actions as beneficial to Tel Aviv and those who see the opposite?
Four constraints stand out in relation to the Arab position on what is now unfolding in Syria.
1. The tendency of Arab regimes to oppose revolutions for fear that the contagion may spread. This is something we have seen across the board wherever revolutions have taken hold.
2. The fear that Islamist militias could take over a country the size of Syria, which might provide encouragement for similar groups in other Arab countries to follow the example of their Syrian counterparts.
3. The official and popular stance towards the ongoing war in Gaza and its impact on Arab-Israeli relations for the foreseeable future, especially as the Assad regime is aligned with the so-called Axis of Resistance, even if only from the perspective of logistical support for fighters and hosting some Palestinian resistance factions in Damascus.
4. The desire to confront Iran’s influence in the Arab world, an influence that has been on the rise in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Gaza ever since the US conquest of Iraq in 2003.
The interplay between these four factors seems to be determined to a large extent by the Aqsa Flood, as Arab regimes fear the strengthening of Islamist influence. This has been seen before in Syria, as well as in interventions in Libya, Yemen, Tunisia and Sudan. Confronting the influence of Iran has led some Arab governments to approach the Aqsa Flood itself from the perspective of confronting Iranian expansion in the Arab world. This explains the approach of some Arab states towards Israel as a bulwark against the Iranian project, as well as towards the Assad regime on the other side.
So far, Arab governments have stuck to the course of bringing Syria back into the fold, as they count on the possibility of pulling the country out of Iran’s orbit if the regime can be saved and its land restored with Arab assistance. Certain Arab governments understand Israeli concerns about jihadist factions seizing power in Syria and the idea that this might pump new blood into the veins of the Resistance, rather than it being defeated as some Arab elites hope.
All of this creates a landscape of utmost complexity, especially as some Arab governments find themselves, even if only temporarily, needing to coordinate with Iran and accept Russia’s intervention against the armed groups. Some may consider that this latest bloody chapter in Syria provides an opportunity to reconfigure Arab and Israeli approaches to the war on Gaza, whether or not Assad prevails and keeps the lines open into Lebanon or he is defeated and the armed groups move on to confront Hezbollah and Iran in Syria or even Lebanon. Or things could shift in a completely opposite direction, with an attempt to liberate the Golan from Israel. This may of course just be a line for propaganda purposes to calm the fears of the Arab street that deposing Assad would leave the Lebanese resistance exposed from behind.
Regardless of all these scenarios and how the war on Syrian soil progresses, Arab governments are lining up their priorities on the basis of preventing Assad’s demise and for it to be clear that this happened because of the Arab role. This would have a dual purpose: one, by not leaving the Syrian arena to Iran, encouraging Assad’s disengagement from Tehran, and, two, by repositioning Syria in the Arab-Israeli conflict in favour of the camp that seeks a peaceful solution to the Palestine question, setting it to one side and recruiting Israel within the vision of the Arab countries confronting Iran. As things play out, we must not take our eyes from what is happening in Gaza, as that will have significant influence on all other arrangements.
Editor's note: The article was written before the announcement that rebel forces had captured the Syrian capital. The headline has been modified to reflect the new situation.
