The fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is not something we should lament. His regime had been clinging to the wreckage of history, failing to initiate reforms or confront its enemies, propped up by Russia and Iran as part of their own ill-starred regional and international conflicts. The regime’s base eroded under crushing economic sanctions until only a corrupt inner circle remained. Everyone else was awaiting salvation.

The kind of salvation that came – not the salvation itself – is what raises concerns about the future of Syria. As little as a week ago, most Arab capitals were watching the armed insurgents take over one region after another and expressing the hope, at least in public, that Assad could survive with a measure of internal reform. But events overtook them faster than anyone could imagine. In just a matter of hours came the realisation how much had changed, with Türkiye exerting its influence and interests over Syria on one side and Israel exploiting the fragile new situation on the other, by hollowing out Syria’s military capabilities and creating new facts on the armistice line.  

The sight of armed groups led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) bearing down on Damascus had echoes of the 2011 Arab Spring when revolutions erupted in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria. Despite the different contexts of each country, the outcome might look similar: Islamist forces coming to power with external support. However, in Egypt and Tunisia political Islam took to the ballot box and was victorious, only to be thwarted by counter-revolutionary pressures. It was different in Syria, where a civil opposition failed to force concessions from a repressive, totalitarian regime and the revolution underwent a transformation with much bloodshed. As such it is hard to plot a connection between the al-Qaeda-descendant HTC and other movements that embraced civil revolution with an Islamist character.

But these contradictions do not take away from the Syrians’ right to celebrate the fall of the Assad regime after the deaths of some 500,000 people since 2011 and the displacement of almost half the population either internally or as refugees abroad. Nor does it diminish the repercussions that will be felt across the Arab region as a result of events in Syria.

Türkiye versus the Arabs

Arab governments were at loggerheads with Assad for aligning Syria with the Islamic revolution in Iran and saw Damascus’s dependence on Shia Iran as a major factor fuelling their sectarian differences. However, the defeat or decline of Iran, because of the progress of the Gaza and Lebanon wars in which Tehran supported Hamas and Hizbullah, came like a bolt from the blue for the Assad regime. Meanwhile, the militias that advanced through the Syrian heartland, finally taking Damascus, were under the wing of another regional power, Türkiye. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made no secret of this fact before the fall of the Assad regime, nor did his foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, on the day it fell, heralding it as a new phase sponsored by Türkiye. In the space of a week, the regional sponsor changed along with the regime, and the countries of the Arab League are completely out of the picture.

It is possible Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates kept silent so as not to be accused of opposing the will of the Syrian people. But there can be no doubt of the past disagreement between this trio and Türkiye over its support for Islamist movements in the wake of the Arab Spring. Over time, these differences seem to have healed, but events in Syria run the risk of reviving them, especially given the type of armed Islamist movements that Türkiye is supporting, albeit for pragmatic reasons.

Cairo’s reticence is clearly understood. One reason why Egypt’s military establishment fell out with the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 was the call by President-elect Mohamed Morsi to “open the gates of Jihad” in Syria. Egypt had maintained ties with the Assad regime for national security reasons after the Arab League had suspended Syria. Egypt continues to be under a state of siege, and it will not accept a return of jihadist or Islamist movements that it has battled over the years, especially not in light of events in Syria. Although the context is different, there are similarities with the situation in Libya, where Türkiye has also played a role. However, Turkish influence over developments in Syria – owing to geographical proximity, militia affiliations and Ankara’s backing of opposition groups over the last 13 years, far exceeds any Arab influence on the Syrian theatre. Türkiye also occupies border areas in northern Syria, claiming its presence is necessary to counter Kurdish separatists. Some observers also believe Turkish intelligence was facilitating entry of the Islamic State group when it took over vast tracts of Syria and Iraq in the mid-2010s. Some Arab regimes have suspicions about Türkiye’s plans to expand within the Arab region and its monopolization of the Syrian area does nothing to dispel such suspicions.

The role of Israel

Conventional wisdom held that Israel had much to gain from the survival of the Assad regime in recent years. Apart from its support for Hizbullah in Lebanon and close ties to Iran, the regime has avoided any genuine confrontation with Israel since the two countries signed the 1974 armistice agreement. For several years, Syrian airspace had been open to Israeli warplanes to strike at will at anything considered to be an Iranian or Hizbullah target, not to mention actual Syrian military installations. As the Assad regime was falling, Israel stood aside, waiting to see what would happen on the ground.

But the silence was lifted on the day of Assad’s departure when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that a series of Israeli air strikes had been a major factor in his downfall. Chief of staff Herzi Halevi declared Syria and “open front”, with the cancellation of the disengagement resolution in the Golan Heights. Meanwhile Netanyahu has reached out to minorities in Syria, saying he wants peace. Until a new, cohesive order is formed in Syria that has the ability to defend the country’s territory, Israel is expected to continue military operations inside Syria under any pretext, as it has done since Assad’s departure. Without a regular army, the emerging Syrian leadership will not be able to challenge any Israeli provocations, especially as it tries to make its case to be accepted among Washington and its allies in Western capitals.

Netanyahu talks openly about reshaping the whole Middle East to fit the Israeli disposition, and it seems unlikely that Ankara will confront Israel in the Syrian arena. More likely is that a balance of interests and spheres of influence will prove an alternative to confrontation. Here, Israel appears as the big winner, having removed Iran’s presence on its borders, while the Assad regime that supported Hizbullah has fallen and been replaced by those who are hostile to it and Iran. Moreover, the new leadership is now, and will be for a long time to come, unequal to the task of confronting Israel’s interventions in order to strip Syria of any military component, opening the arena up possibly for many years to come.

The Kurdish role

Kurds make up about 10% of the Syrian population and have been among the biggest beneficiaries of the years of turmoil that have gripped Syria since 2011. Kurds did participate in the early uprisings, but their separatist ambitions have grown over time, and different factions were able to form their own de facto autonomous region in the north and east as the Damascus government withdrew its forces. They have served as a key ally of the United States in the war against Islamic State and their reward has been an expanded autonomous region containing Syria’s largest oil and gas fields, where 900 US troops are stationed to fight IS. Kurds now control about one quarter of Syrian territory, including Arab-majority cities like Raqqa.

Kurdish expansionism is one of the key reasons for Turkey’s insistence on creating a 30-kilometre buffer zone in northern Syria and its intervention against the activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which Ankara claims is linked to Kurdish groups in Syria. US support has continued for the Kurds, despite President Donald Trump’s first-term pledge to end US interventional in Syria and his efforts to withdraw US troops, which was opposed by the Department of Defense. Although Türkiye has said it seeks the unity of Syrian territory, there are fears the Kurds will not comply with this aim, therefore losing US support for their demand. Federalism may be the best solution, but who would accept that on the Arab side is unclear. Could Kurdish ambitions at the expense of the Arab component be a time bomb in the quest to establish a new system in Syria? The federal experience of Iraq, which brought about the creation of its Kurdistan Region, is not exactly a good model to follow in Syria. However, a similar move might be inevitable within reasonable boundaries in the absence of a comprehensive democratic framework.