Ever since the outbreak of popular protests against the rule of President Bashar al-Assad in March 2011, complicated questions have arisen about the future of Syria—How should the country be governed, what kind of constitution should it have, how to manage civil relations and relations with neighbouring countries, what kind of culture should prevail, and more besides? 

These questions have always been there over the last 13 years, even if interest in them has ebbed and flowed along with the complexity of the Syrian crisis. We have seen the pathways to reform being blocked, the advent of unprecedented violence by the  regime, the rise of jihadist movements and the involvement of a multiplicity of regional and international players in the struggle over Syria. The key questions faded into the background, as the government seized back control over large swathes of opposition-held territory, with Iranian and Russian assistance, and the laborious process began to re-float President Bashar al-Assad and normalize relations with countries that had fallen out with Syria. Overthrowing the regime seemed to be off the agenda, except among a few scattered remnants that were incapable of doing so.

How much has changed! The collapse of the Syrian government after the rapid military manoeuvres beginning on November 27, culminating in President Assad fleeing the country and the fall of Damascus on December 8. The post-2011 questions have returned with a vengeance!

Who will rule over Syria?

The most urgent question concerns the form and nature of the government that will rule Syria going forwards. Will Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) harvest the fruit of the struggles that millions of Syrians fought in throughout the years of the revolution, or will it lead a process of transformation that includes representation and involvement by other political and social organisations? Bringing in the “Salvation Government”, which had been in charge of Idlib and parts of the Aleppo governorate, for three months to run the affairs of the transitional government indicates a potential move towards the monopolization of power. A lack of clarity over the future role of HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara (aka Abu Muhammad al-Jolani) is another ominous sign of the group’s intentions. Nor has there been any serious discussion about a comprehensive national dialogue bringing in other political and civil voices. It does not help that HTS is on a list of terrorist organisations under a UN Security Council resolution as well as being designated as a terror group by Washington, further complicating matters.

Meanwhile, several other political and civil groups have begun to raise the call for a different direction, based primarily on UN Resolution 2254 of 2015, which calls for a comprehensive political transition in Syria. However, implementation would require on the one hand international consensus accompanied by real pressure on Syria’s de facto rulers and, on the other hand,  a different reality on the ground that does not seem to be present today.

Other armed factions are indicating their disagreement with HTS’s domination of the field, especially around the ascendancy of al-Shara as its leader. Most prominent of these is the Syrian National Army (SNA), which is backed by Turkey and is active in the north of the country. Swallowing up such factions might not be too difficult for HTS. There are other groups dotted around the south, specifically in the Deraa governorate, where the 5^th Corps has maintained part of the Syrian opposition force to Assad, with Russian consent. The HTS may find a way to bring this region under control despite some obstacles, and to bring such groups under its wing, especially by dint of their shared Sunni Muslim identity—that is unless these other factions receive significant support from other circles outside Syria.

Minorities and Assad remnants

Adjacent to Deraa you have Sweida Governorate, where a different kind of test is emerging. This is an area with a Druze majority, whose armed factions are heavily influenced by the moral authority of their religious leaders. Just as the overall picture in Syria remains shrouded in mystery, so too is the fate of other religious minorities under the supposed authority of a group with a strictly Islamist orientation and a Salafist/Jihadist past (and possibly future).

The sternest test that faces Syria’s new rulers is the one posed by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) at its heart. The SDF is based on Kurdish nationalist aspirations and is relatively centralized as an organization, exerting control over large areas of northeastern Syria, including the most important oil fields. It is also backed by the US, which added its weight to the eradication of Islamic State (IS) around Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah and Aleppo.

We cannot rule out the possibility of other armed factions taking the stage in future. Most officers and personnel in the security services and the army made themselves scarce when Assad escaped to Moscow on December 8. The lesson of Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 is that such an absence may not be perman. Saddam’s forces came back under different guises ranging from local factions resisting US troops to implacable jihadists at war with the rest of humanity. No doubt the conflict was fuelled to an extent by the Sunni Arab minority’s feelings of being excluded and marginalized after decades holding power in Iraq. The same could be said of the Alawite minority in Syria, who also face collective punishment for their centrality in the Assad government, and especially as a very large numbers of Alawites were recruited into the state security services and the military.

Economics and accountability

The top question in the minds of most Syrians concerns the economy and the cost of living. Worn down by years of civil war, Syria has witnessed astounding levels of corruption, economic incompetence and Western sanctions that have hollowed out the main branches of the national economy. Destruction of infrastructure and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents, who include—of course—professional people and technical and other experts, as well as a large portion of the general workforce. Paradoxically, it is sometimes the case that democratic aspirations and political transformation after years of tyrannical rule can raise the ceiling of expectation and hasten positive changes affecting people’s lives. The level of deterioration in living conditions and the economy that Syria has experienced in the final years of the Assad government may alleviate some of the public pressure on whatever new government takes shape, with the expectation that economic conditions will improve if stability is achieved, with an influx of regional and international economic support and perhaps also foreign investment.

Another difficult and multi-layered question concerns justice and accountability in the new Syria. Who will be held accountable, and by whom? Under what law will accountability be brought? Will perpetrators from all sides be brought to justice, including from the ranks of the victorious opposition? Will the statute of limitations extend to beyond 2011, for example to the Hama massacre of 1982 when tens of thousands were killed? Is a form of interim justice applicable? Or should an international tribunal take on the task? What about the corruption and plunder that has occurred?

Of all these concerns, the most current question relates to the tens of thousands of people disappeared in the prison system of the former regime, as well as a smaller numbers taken by armed factions across Syria. There are humanitarian, political and social dimensions to this issue that lie beneath the surface, and it is one that cuts across other matters such as justice, political transition, civil peace  and effective government. Civil society will take a long time to recover from the horrific methodology of detention, torture, forced disappearance and coercion of the families of detainees. There is no better evidence of the continuing tragedy of this issue than the scene of thousands of families assembling at the notorious Sednaya prison and security HQ in the hope that they might find information about the fate of their loved ones.

What is needed is superhuman effort by Syrians to uncover the locations of mass graves, putting together forensic operations, identifying bodies and separating the remains.  It is a complex task that requires international expertise and support, while graves need to be protected from interference and the desperate attempts of families to find missing loved ones.

The wider picture

Every question above is linked to the issue of how Syria will conduct its relations with neighbouring countries and the wider world. Opposition forces battled a Syrian regime that was supported by an array of forces, most notably the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Hizbullah from Lebanon, and various Iraqi militias. Latterly, Russia intervened to save the regime from imminent defeat in 2015. On top of the problematic relationship between Syria and these players, there is the question of what does Israel want now. It swept through territory adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights and has launched hundreds of air sorties to destroy Syria’s strategic military capabilities to prevent them from falling to the hands of the country’s new rulers.

Turkey may have the upper hand in the short and medium term, as the latest regional power to get into bed with certain opposition groups, but it will keep a cautious eye on the SDF. Meanwhile, other regional powers have conflicting interests, concerns and fears in Syria. Jihadist movements that remain active could cause a security headache for a number of countries. Then there is the potential influx of millions of refugees currently living the Gulf, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and western countries. Some of these countries have multi-level relations with actors inside Syria. Syrians, for their part, need a stable and close relationship with all outside powers to achieve stability and security, to attract investments and economic support, not to mention helping in the process of finding mass graves and other pressing tasks.