In the aftermath of the apparent attempted coup against Russian President Vladimir Putin by the Wagner Group, commentators are speculating about the impact events in Moscow will have on the various regions in which the private military firm operates. Wagner mercenaries are an influential force across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where their actions have helped shift the balance of power in several countries as well as fuelling conflict and human rights abuses.

 

Until now, the Wagner Group has acted as a proxy for Putin’s government, but following their recent mutiny it appears that operational responsibility has been placed more heavily upon Russia’s official Ministry of Defense (MOD). This will likely make it more difficult to deny its involvement in foreign conflicts, leading to rising tensions and further instability. What does this mean for the MENA region?

 

Syria

 

Syria is something of a special case in the region, as Russia is open about a large portion of its military activities in the region. The Wagner Group has maintained a presence in Syria since the deployment of the Russian army in 2015 to fight against insurgents alongside President Bashar Al-Assad’s military forces. One of Wagner’s primary current duties in Syria is to secure operations at oil, gas, and phosphate fields in the central and eastern parts of Syria, most notably Shaer, al-Mahr, Jazal, and Hayan. 

 

Shifting dynamics within Wagner may prevent Russia from continuing to do this effectively, undermining Moscow’s military position in the country more generally. It might also impede the Kremlin’s legitimacy in managing Bashar al-Assad’s international rehabilitation, which serves Russia’s strategic interests in the Middle East. While some Syrian dissidents and activists rejoiced upon hearing about the domestic unrest in Russia, pro-Assad media stayed relatively quiet. 

 

Over the past few weeks, skirmishes between Wagner fighters and Russian MOD personnel led to the arrest of several Wagner commanders. Wagner offices across Syria were also raided by Russian forces.

 

Libya

 

In Libya, the Wagner Group has played a crucial role in assisting Khalifa Haftar in seizing control of the country’s southern and eastern provinces. Mines planted by Wagner mercenaries have killed and maimed scores of civilians since Haftar’s assault on Tripoli in 2019/20, igniting intense animosity among sections of the Libyan public. It appears Wagner, which had links to the late former president Muammar Gaddafi’s son Said al-Islam Gaddafi, was also involved in disinformation campaigns to influence the outcome of the 2019 Libyan election.  

 

The implications of the failed mutiny in Moscow on Wagner’s activities in Libya are unclear, as the group operates a complex web of activities away from the watchful eyes of the Russian military. One thing is clear – trying to bring Wagner’s Libyan operations under Moscow’s control may be a significant challenge.

 

Sudan

 

Former Sudanese ruler Omar al-Bashir called upon Wagner mercenaries in 2019 to help him maintain order. The group is still deployed to protect Sudan’s gold mines. Wagner and Putin are believed to have benefitted lavishly from Sudanese gold, which has helped Moscow circumvent some of the Western sanctions that have been imposed since the start of the war in Ukraine. 

 

Wagner is thought to be playing both sides in Sudan’s conflict: the national army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The group appears to be closer to the RSF however, whose leader was spotted in Moscow immediately after the invasion of Ukraine. Neither side has commented on the situation publicly, but some observers have pointed out similarities between Wagner's and the RSF’s modes of operation.

 

Iran

 

Tehran has long been officially aligned with Moscow. When news first broke of the Wagner coup, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanaani rushed to publicly advocate for maintaining the rule of law in Russia. However, other officials deemed the matter an internal issue that should be dealt with without foreign interference. Some oppositionists in Iran welcomed the developments, which they saw as a sign Putin may not be able to prop up Iran’s government as it did Syria’s.

 

Mali

 

The military forces at the helm of Mali’s government, which rose to power in 2021, are long known to have worked with Wagner to maintain security. This collaboration increased following the withdrawal of French troops from Malian soil. The ousting of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2020 led to a pivot away from the West and towards Russia. It is alleged that the Malian government pays Wagner upwards of 10 million USD per month. If so this indicated that Bamako is now firmly on the side of the Kremlin.

 

Sub-Saharan Africa

 

Since 2018, the Wagner Group has built significant military and economic ties in a number of countries in Africa. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that “instructors” and “private military contractors” would remain in Mali and the Central African Republic. Wagner also has a presence in countries such as Burkina Faso, Mozambique, and Madagascar.

 

Wagner contractors have made the Central African Republic (CAR) a hub for their African operations, selling weapons and military strategy to regional governments. Wagner mercenaries control the Bangui airport and work as part of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra security forces in exchange for access to the country’s resources, most notably diamonds, gold, and timber. Hundreds of military advisors have been accused of carrying out severe repression against people protesting their presence. 

 

CAR Officials are said to have been worried about the potential departure of Wagner troops following the Moscow coup attempt, due to the country’s reliance on the mercenaries. However, more Wagner forces arrived in the country at the end of July ahead of a referendum in which they helped President Touadéra to a resounding victory.

 

The long-term consequences of the crisis in Moscow have yet to fully materialize. Members of Wagner have been left to choose between signing contracts with the Russian MOD or other law enforcement and security agencies, returning home, or choosing exile in Belarus. This suggests that Wagner troops may yet be allowed to continue their operations abroad. As far as the MENA region is concerned, the exact conditions of future deployments are still unclear due to the volatile nature of the conflicts across the region.

 

Moscow is keen to maintain a foothold in Syria and Libya to show it still has an international presence despite the war in Ukraine. A Russian retreat from the Middle East and Africa is thus unlikely, but a rearranging of operations may be on the menu. As the war in Ukraine drags on, the Kremlin has found Wagner’s operations abroad a successful way of generating revenue, but it is clear that the Wagner issue has the potential to lead to further instability in the Middle East and Africa as well as at home in Russia.