The whole time that Benjamin Netanyahu was receiving from President Joe Biden the US military support and political cover he needed to continue his wars in Gaza and Lebanon, the Israeli PM was secretly collaborating with rival candidate Donald Trump.

The PM’s biggest contribution was to stall the ceasefire agreement in Gaza before the elections, so neither Democratic presidential candidates Biden and Kamala Harris, nor their congressional colleagues, would benefit from it. Then money started pouring into Trump's campaign from pro-Israel donors, including Miriam Adelson, who alone gave about $100 million.

Was Netanyahu ungrateful? Did Israel's supporters forget all the things they got from Biden? Didn’t Netanyahu congratulate Biden on his victory in the 2020 elections, causing a rift in his relationship with Trump? But what Netanyahu understands, unlike many Arabs, is the difference between the two men, Biden and Trump. There’s a popular Arabic proverb “Ahmed is like Hajj Ahmed”. It suggests Washington’s policy doesn’t change; the president is a mere tool of the deep state doing what the political and military matrix wants. But Arab observers are fond of these phrases which save them the trouble of doing research.

Israelis on the other hand, especially Netanyahu with his wealth of experience of Washington, not only can tell the difference between one US politician and another, but also can be relied on to exploit those differences. That’s why Netanyahu supported Trump and the Republicans—not for personal reasons, or because Biden yelled at him during one of their fractious phone calls. It was because Trump and the Republicans represent the conservative right, whose political base supports the right-wing Likud and the current government, which is the most extreme in Israel’s history.

 There may not be any more military support that Trump will provide in Gaza. What is more important to Netanyahu is the aftermath of the ceasefire and how the region will be reshaped according to Israel's vision.

Take Trump's statement bemoaning Israel's small size and the possibility of making it larger. Of course he won't be donating part of his Mar-a-Lago estate for that purpose! But it was mentioned at an event organised by Miriam Adelson, who wants him to recognise Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and for Gaza to be reoccupied. It is not that surprising therefore that he should suggest that Palestinians should be relocated from Gaza to Egypt and Jordan, and that housing should be created for them “to live in peace... in the long term”.

Trump views Gaza with the eyes of a real estate mogul. Ethnic cleansing of Gaza would open it up for investment and tourism projects. Trump is not interested in two million people, deprived of food and drink and subjected to genocide. He shares his son-in-law Jared Kushner’s impression of Gaza as an excellent Mediterranean location with good weather, that could be rebuilt “differently”, that is without its original inhabitants in the world’s most densely populated spot.

A “moderate” among pro-Israel hawks?

This is the difference that many Arabs did not understand, even those living in the US who voted for Trump in the recent elections.  Netanyahu was looking ahead to the next stage when he could obtain from Trump what he could not dream of obtaining from the Democrats.

Despite Biden's disgraceful stance on the Israeli war machine’s assault on Gaza, his administration was clear and decisive from the beginning about two things: No reoccupation of Gaza and no annexation of the West Bank. This reflects strong opposition to these moves within the Democratic party, which broadly supports Palestinian rights and the establishment of a Palestinian state. According to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, Biden may be “the last pro-Israel Democratic president of the US”.

The irony is that, even with his generous support for Israel, going so far as recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in a clear reversal of a decades-long US policy, Trump looks like a moderate, compared with some of the right-wing hawks in his camp.

Trump’s pick as representative to the United Nations, Alice Stefanik, believes Israel has a biblical right to the West Bank, and refused at a Senate hearing to recognise the Palestinians' right to self-determination. National security adviser Mike Waltz declined to say whether the Trump administration would object to Israel's reoccupation of Gaza. The new ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, is known for his long-standing relationship with Jewish settlers and his refusal to acknowledge anything called the West Bank, which he calls “Judea and Samaria”. These extremist positions do not differ much from those of the secretaries of state and defence either.

Between two options on Iran

Despite the recent focus on Gaza, the first and real test of the new administration's orientation will be related to Iran. Netanyahu may respond tactically to Trump's desire not to return to war in Gaza, but he may wait for major strategic gains, either with Washington's participation in striking Iranian nuclear sites or providing the weapons required to do so, especially heavy, bunker-piercing missiles.

Trump has a stated aversion to wars. As he said in his inauguration speech:

“We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars that we end, and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” But let's not forget that he was the one who withdrew from the nuclear deal with Iran in 2018, influenced by the advice of his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, and his former national security adviser John Bolton. He also ordered the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani despite Senator Lindsey Graham's warnings that the move could lead to a direct war with Iran. Even when Netanyahu retracted Israel's participation in the assassination, Trump did not care and Washington carried it out unilaterally. So while he may say he seeks peace, his actions are unpredictable.

According to a report by Bloomberg, the current direction of his administration is to impose more economic sanctions on Tehran, especially by hindering its oil exports and waiting to see if it is willing to strike a new deal to curb its nuclear programme, but this remains subject to two factors:

First: Iran is now at its weakest point from the US and Israeli point of view, after the destruction of most of its air defence bases and the weakening of its allies Hamas and Hizbullah, so that Iran would be unable to mount a strong response against Israel. Meanwhile, more time would give Iran the opportunity to repair its air defence system in cooperation with Russia, with which it recently signed a strategic cooperation agreement, not to mention allowing Hizbullah to mitigate some of its losses.

Second: There are indications the Netanyahu government will not allow this “historic opportunity” to pass for settling Israel’s long-standing accounts with the Ayatollahs' regime and get rid of the Iranian nuclear headache decisively, as well as perhaps destroying Iran’s oil facilities in a way that weakens the regime or leads to its downfall.

My personal belief is that Trump will try to avoid full-scale war at the beginning of his second term. But he may later accept supporting Israeli military action or even actual participation against Iran. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth is demanding not only to strike Iran’s nuclear sites, but also to destroy economic and even cultural sites in Iran. Such acts would be violations of the laws of war, but Hegseth dismisses those as unwarranted curbs on US troops.

The only person not to adopt a very hard-line position towards Iran appears to be Tulsi Gabbard, but she faces significant opposition to her nomination as director of national intelligence, even among mainstream Republicans, mainly for this reason.

It does not seem likely that Trump will allow a long time for sanctions on Iran to achieve their goals, especially after they have proven to be ineffectual in the past. More probably, he will put two options in front of Iran: Either comply with a new, stricter agreement to end its nuclear programme completely or face significant military action.

The full normalisation card

Netanyahu has been keen to expand acceptance of Israel in the region via the Abraham Accords, which create the normalisation of ties between Israel and the Gulf states.

This is a major goal that the new Trump administration has stressed is a top priority.

However, Saudi Arabia has emphasised it links such a step to moving towards the establishment of a Palestinian state, which creates a major obstacle to the implementation of the strategy of shaping the region according to the Likud vision.

Mike Huckabee has stated that Trump does not care about a Palestinian state, and when National Security Advisor Mike Waltz was asked about it, he said it would be left to negotiations with Saudi Arabia.

Some of those close to Trump, such as evangelical Zionist Mike Evans, say the administration wants Palestinian autonomy under Israeli sovereignty. That would certainly be rejected by the Palestinians and would be difficult for the Saudis to accept given the kingdom’s important role in the Islamic world which it would not want to  sacrifice it for the sake of a weak, losing deal.

According to the Washington Post’s David Ignatius, Trump addressed the World Economic Forum in Davos “almost like a 21st-century emperor announcing edicts to his newly conquered princes and satraps”, but he may soon be forced to choose between two paths. Israeli expansion, hegemony and occupation, or acceptance, integration and normalisation. It is either one path or the other—it will not be possible to do both.

Trump will realise that his imperial power has its limits, and that in the Middle East it may be at its most fragile and broken. The region is like quicksand. It looks soft on the surface, but can drag down those who ignore it to the depths..