Over the past decades, the Arabs have proclaimed Palestine to be their central issue, but they have not been completely faithful to this cause. The reality is every state has focused on its own direct and narrow interests, as perceived by that state—or rather as perceived by those who run that state—which often runs counter to the interests of the Palestinian people.

When the Al-Aqsa Flood erupted in October 2023, Arab regimes were expecting a war similar to its predecessors in the time since the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) took control of  the Gaza Strip and began administering it. These regimes assumed it would be enough to issue a few statements and declarations in support of the Palestinians—or to stay silent, or maybe to condemn Hamas for “starting the fighting” this time (if one ignores the real history of the conflict and the legitimacy of confronting the occupation). However, the regimes were surprised to find themselves confronted by a different war this time, in terms of the amount of firepower used, the duration, and the extent of Israel’s war aims.

Not only was there a quantitative difference with this war—there was a qualitative difference from its predecessors as well. This war exposed the hidden goal that the Tel Aviv elite has been keeping under wraps since 1948. Although it still has not been officially declared, this was the war for “Greater Israel”, determining the extent to which the geographical expansion of the Jewish state is achieved by swallowing up the entirety of historic Palestine and displacing the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as taking the Syrian plateau of the Golan Heights, with the possibility of adding the border area of southern Lebanon and Mount Hermon in Syria to its territory.

Suddenly the Arab regimes—especially the frontline states, but also further afield—found themselves facing a completely different equation, one in which the interests of the Palestinian people aligned fully with their own interests. They have finally realized that eliminating the Palestinian issue, as Israel intends to do, would not only make the Arab regimes look bad in front of their populations; in fact, the whole regional edifice would collapse. Some countries’ territorial integrity would be violated, others would be fragmented, and a third group would be put under such severe strain as fragile vassal states that their ruling elites could fall like autumn leaves. The scenario of the Palestinians being ethnically cleansed would provoke social unrest and raise questions about the legitimacy of any government which stayed silent or accepted it. The division and disintegration would be on a par with, if not worse than, the consequences of the Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France which carved up the region following the fall of the Ottoman Empire after WWI.

For historical, geographical and political reasons, the impact of this scenario would fall most heavily on neighbouring Egypt and Jordan. Historically, Gaza was under Egyptian administration before 1967, and the West Bank was under Jordanian administration until King Hussein ceded Jordan’s claim in 1989. But throughout previous Israeli assaults on the Palestinians, these historical and geographical ties have never put Cairo and Amman in the eye of the storm to this degree, no matter how much death and destruction was caused.

The current situation could land the Sinai Peninsula in grave danger. Resistance would not end if Egypt accepted the displacement of Palestinians onto its territory. If Israel then targeted resistance groups in the Sinai, as it has always done against Palestinian camps and movements in Syria and Lebanon, Egypt would find itself under pressure to respond. On the other hand, if Egypt refused to accept the Palestinians of Gaza, Israel might consider forcibly expelling them. That would put the Egyptian army in a dilemma. If would be difficult to let the displaced people enter Sinai, but it would be even worse if the army confronted them. Israel might even imagine it needed to occupy a border strip from Sinai in order to expel the Gazans.

The Jordanian situation is equally problematic. Displacing part of the population of Gaza to Jordon would doubtless be a step towards displacing the population of the West Bank, which is viewed as an even greater prize for the proponents of Greater Israel, especially among the extremist religious right.

The influx of even more Palestinians into Jordan would create significant demographic imbalance in the Hashemite Kingdom, impacting government, and potentially causing turmoil. Currently a buffer in between Israel, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia, the kingdom could become a launchpad of resistance, as a huge refugee majority pressured the decision-makers to align with upholders of the Palestinian right of return and restoration of the pre-1948 land.

It is no surprise, therefore, that Egypt and Jordan are keen to address the displacement scenario, but does this necessarily mean the two countries identify with the resistance? The answer is of course, No,  not necessarily. From the point of view of  Arab League Secretary General Ahmed Aboul Gheit, according to comments he made to Al-Arabiya TV, Hamas should “step down” if that’s in the Palestinian interest. A lot of people were disturbed by this statement, with some analysis suggesting Arab countries would take over the Gaza Strip and rebuild and stabilise it on the condition that the Palestinian Authority, established under the Oslo Accords, would take responsibility for its administration.

There’s a problem with this scenario is its ignorance of history. Handing over the neck of the resistance to Israel to stop the people of Gaza being displaced may help market the idea to the people, but whenever something like this has happen before—and it has happened dozens of times in Arab history, when caliphs, kings and emirs have ordered their soldiers to lay down their weapons in exchange for the safety of the people—the invading armies have put their swords to the necks of civilians and disarmed warriors alike.

Given Israel's ongoing anger at Egypt’s refusal to bend, and US President Donald Trump's threats to cut off aid to Egypt if it does not agree to his vision for Gaza, this analysis can be rebutted. In addition to the fact that Egypt has repeatedly rejected Israel’s offer—during the government of Hosni Mubarak—to hand back administration of the Gaza Strip, Egypt is well aware that there is no guarantee the resistance will not oppose any outside force entering Gaza to take over security control, especially with the contradictory goals of the two parties.

The biggest betrayal of all must be that some Arabs foster an illusion that the expulsion of the people of Gaza and Israel or America taking control will result in them getting a share of Trump’s promised “Gaza Riviera”, as merchants or contractors.  

To begin with, the most likely scenario is that the people of Gaza will remain there through their steadfastness, sincerity and resistance. And if the situation slips back into a catastrophic scenario, its negative impact will not stop at the borders of Gaza or Palestine more broadly. Based on the historical record and the likely chain of events, it will impact the entire Arab regional system.