It goes without saying that the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria brought with it a massive change in the country’s foreign relations and its regional position, in parallel with the immense change domestically.
Assad’s flight on the morning of 8 December 2024 heralded a new stage in the series of heavy blows felt by Iran since 7 October 2023 in terms of its regional plans. These included the dismantling of the structures of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad—both allies of Iran—and the assassination of many of their political and military leaders, followed by the hammering of Hizbullah in Lebanon, which reached its peak in the second half of September with the pager attacks and the assassinations of elite Radwan Force commanders, culminating in the assassination of the party’s Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. In addition, the Houthi group Ansar Allah in Yemen has continued to suffer ongoing strikes, although they remain defiant in their hostility toward Israel. All of this has occurred alongside slow, yet ongoing, efforts to curb the influence of Tehran’s allies in Iraq.
It was self-evident that the vacuum left by Iran in Syria would draw in regional powers seeking to fill it, especially given the precarious position of the new Syrian state at the political, military, economic, and social level. The focus naturally turned to Syria’s more powerful and stable neighbours: Türkiye to the north and Israel to the south, both of whom have interests and concerns in this new reality that often contradict more than they align. Syria today has become something like a bridge connecting them—or rather a barrier separating them—and a central arena for competing influence between them.
For Ankara, the Kurdish issue represents the primary and most pressing concern. Over the years, this concern has evolved into a real threat for Türkiye, which views the matter through a highly sensitive national security lens. The power of the Syrian Kurds—particularly the YPG which is supported by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)—has grown over time at the expense of the Arab Syrian opposition factions backed by Türkiye. They benefited from their alliance with the United States in the war against Islamic State, took control of large areas in northern and northeastern Syria, and established the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are well-organized and well-armed.
Later, and gradually, Türkiye succeeded in curbing Kurdish expansion. However, the perceived threat from across the border persists. Several key cities in northeastern Syria, as well as the most important oil fields, remain under Kurdish factional control.
In this context, the statements made by Kurdish leader Ilham Ahmed to the Jerusalem Post a few months ago were notable: "The crisis of the Middle East requires that everyone understand that without Israel and Jewish people playing a role, a democratic solution for the region will not happen." However, despite this signal, Israel does not appear poised to play a more active role in the Syrian Kurdish arena—first, due to the geographical distance between Kurdish-majority areas and Israel, and second, to avoid an open and more severe confrontation with Türkiye.
In contrast to the Kurdish ethnic minority in the north, the Druze religious minority in the south emerges as a key concern for Israel—even though the Druze make up only about 1.6% of Israel’s total population. On this front, official Israeli statements have repeatedly emphasized “red lines” and a commitment to protecting the Druze. This was reflected in recent drone strikes by Israel targeting Syrian government forces during clashes with local Druze factions. Meanwhile, tensions persist between the central government in Damascus and the Druze-majority province of Suwayda, where Syrian army and security forces have yet to enter. Amid this scenario, discussions have intensified around the idea of Syria being informally divided into two zones of influence: a northern one dominated by Türkiye, and a southern one where Israel holds the upper hand.
At the heart of the Turkish-Israeli divergence regarding Syria lies the practical and ideological Islamist-jihadist background of the current ruling faction, led by President Ahmed al-Shar’a. His previous nom de guerre—Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—references the Golan Heights, which was occupied by Israel and unilaterally annexed in 1981, defying United Nations resolutions on the matter.
Before the outbreak of the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Assad in 2011, Türkiye wove close ties with many armed groups, such as the "National Army" factions, which fought on behalf of or in cooperation with Ankara against the Kurds in northern Syria. Today, these factions are a core part of Syria’s Ministry of Defence forces. In practice, Türkiye’s relations with military groups inside Syria extended to Jabhat al-Nusra, and later to its successor, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which led the military operation named "Deterring Aggression" that toppled Assad and became the de facto ruler of Damascus. Additionally, some foreign jihadists in Syria, particularly those of Uyghur Turkic ethnicity, have special emotional, cultural, and political ties with Türkiye. These fighters are reportedly the largest and most prominent jihadist bloc, numbering over 3,000 according to most estimates.
Israel does not have similar relations with any of these groups; on the contrary, it views them with suspicion and hostility, considering them one of its main security threats in the foreseeable future. Since the 7 October attack, Israeli decision-makers’ security concerns have intensified. Israel does not distinguish between Syrian Islamic factions, those with an Islamic leaning, or foreign fighters. The anxious Israeli perspective sees any large human cluster near its borders—in Syria, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, or Jordan—as a potential threat. Israel fears any armed activity, whether centralized or decentralized, organized or unorganized, near its borders.
Over recent years, Israel has launched hundreds of airstrikes to cut Hizbullah’s weapons supply lines coming from Iran via Iraq and to prevent the emergence of organisations like Hizbullah in southern Syria. It also targets any potential presence of Hizbullah, Iran, or their allies near the Golan Heights. After Assad’s fall, Israel continued these strikes aiming to destroy the new regime’s strategic military capabilities.
This Israeli concern about any organized hostile force near its borders conflicts with the Syrian Ministry of Defence’s plan to form a substantial army of 200,000 personnel, according to The National newspaper, published in the United Arab Emirates, citing a Syrian military official. Syrian authorities’ reassurances about their commitment to good neighbourly relations and not attacking anyone may not be enough. Israelis certainly won’t be comforted by the fact that many regional armies were built more for internal control than external warfare. Adding to Israeli worries is not just Türkiye’s strong ties with the Syrian factions under the Syrian Ministry of Defence, but also speculation that Türkiye might train and arm the Syrian army. Undoubtedly, no Israeli government would feel comfortable with this army possessing Turkish drones, for example, which proved highly effective during the Russia-Ukraine war.
In the broader picture, there is a regional diplomatic competition between Israel and Türkiye as the two main powers in the area, with Iran’s role declining. The Syrian government’s good relations are not limited to Ankara; President Ahmed al-Shar'a has visited Riyadh, Doha, Kuwait, Manama, Amman, and Abu Dhabi. Here, it can be said that the Sunni Arab embrace of the new regime is largely led by Saudi Arabia, where neighbouring Arab countries align with Türkiye (and the European Union) in supporting Damascus.
These countries also succeeded in persuading the US administration to approach the Syrian situation separately from Israeli priorities, reflected in President Donald Trump’s approval of a cessation of sanctions on Syria and endorsing the inclusion of foreign fighters in the Syrian army as a solution to this complex security dilemma.
Amid this regional competition, Türkiye would prefer to see a centralized, unified Syria under a strong, stable Arab authority—firstly to control the Kurdish ambitions mentioned earlier, secondly to align with the identity of other regional allies, and thirdly because stability ensures the strengthening of bilateral trade with Syria and the Gulf countries behind it. Meanwhile, the Israeli preferences lean toward a federal or decentralized Syria, with special arrangements for religious and ethnic minorities, and a pathway to joining the Abraham Accords framework.
With the cessation of US sanctions on Syria, as well as the lifting of European sanctions, Türkiye finds itself with a huge investment opportunity in a country needing reconstruction worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Turkish companies will have exceptional opportunities in energy, construction, services, transport, manufacturing, and more. Bilateral trade between Syria and Türkiye was nearly $2.5 billion in 2010 before sharply declining with the start of the Syrian revolution and the split between Assad’s regime and Erdoğan’s. On the other hand, Israel has no trade relations with Syria, and no significant change seems likely soon. The talk of possible Israeli use of Syrian labour for industry, construction, and agriculture in the Druze villages of the Golan remains limited to attempts at exercising soft power.
In conclusion, the conflicting priorities in Syria between Israel and Türkiye are clear. Their tug-of-war ranges from Türkiye’s desire for stability under the new regime to Israel’s preference for instability, extending to relations with local powers and regional rivalry. However, both sides still prefer coordination and containment over direct confrontation, though this fragile balance is vulnerable to change.
