On April 15, violence erupted in Sudan after years of simmering tension between two of the country's most powerful leaders: General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the de facto leader and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – also known as Hemeti – who leads the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The fighting began in Khartoum and quickly spread throughout the country, with reports of low-flying planes strafing the ground and horrific human rights abuses being perpetrated.

These developments are indicative of a potential collapse of the state in Sudan, which some experts say is comparable to the situation in Yemen. Adding to the instability is the intense bombing campaign in Khartoum launched by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which is said to have superior air power and may soon gain the upper hand in the capital. The SAF's air force has played a critical role in Sudan's wars, particularly since 2003 when they and the Janjaweed – the precursor to the notorious Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – fought together on the same side during the Darfur conflict.

The RSF's strategic focus on seizing control of airports in the initial stages of the conflict reflects the importance of Sudan's air force, which they sought to ground. Although this strategy has only been partially successful, dislodging the RSF from the residential buildings in Khartoum that they have turned into military installations may take weeks. Additionally, defeating the RSF in their tribal homeland of Darfur is expected to be challenging, given their ability to mobilize fighters from neighboring Chad. The situation in Sudan is rapidly deteriorating, with the prospect of a full-blown civil war becoming more likely with each passing hour.

If a full-scale civil war breaks out in Sudan, it may have consequences that go beyond its borders. In addition to the ongoing conflict in neighboring South Sudan, there are concerns that the conflict in Sudan could draw in regional and global powers. For example, Egyptian soldiers who were training with the SAF were reportedly arrested by the RSF in the early hours of the conflict, leading some diplomats to fear that Cairo may be preparing to support the SAF. There are also reports of tribal mobilization along the border of Chad and Sudan, which is the traditional homeland of Hemeti. Furthermore, part of the RSF's information operation is believed to be based in the United Arab Emirates.

Hemeti, the Sudanese military leader, has enjoyed crucial support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during his involvement in conflicts in Libya and Yemen. The UAE's financial connections to Hemeti's business interests have further strengthened their relationship. Additionally, a recent report by Global Witness indicates that the UAE has supplied military equipment to Hemeti's Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group have also reportedly provided training to RSF troops and had officials stationed inside some of their bases. In an effort to bring an end to the violence, leaders from South Sudan, Djibouti, and Kenya have offered to mediate.

Despite the multitude of actors involved, the United States and its western allies have limited leverage to influence the situation in Sudan. While the U.S. government is collaborating with Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, these countries are supporting opposing sides in the conflict. Western diplomats have acknowledged that a return to the pre-April 15 status quo is becoming increasingly unlikely as the fighting wages on. This lack of U.S. influence marks a stark contrast from just four years ago when Washington held high hopes for Sudan's future.

After months of protests in early 2019, former Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir was overthrown in a military coup. Many saw this as a breakthrough moment for U.S. policy to support democracy in the country. However, the United States and other Western nations pushed for a transitional government made up of both civilian protesters and military leaders, resulting in a transitional constitution and scheduled elections for 2022.

Yet, it was this very transitional constitution that marked the turning point in Sudan's democratic hopes. The military was allowed to lead the country during the first phase of the transition, with Burhan serving as head of state and entrusted with the responsibility of delivering on his promise of democracy. However, it quickly became clear that Western expectations for a successful transition to democracy were overly optimistic.

Sudan's hopes for a civilian-led government were shattered after the country's labor unions, the driving force behind the 2019 protests, lost power to infighting among civilian political parties. Despite the reforms proposed by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemeti, blocked them at every turn. In 2021, Hamdok was ousted in a military coup, exposing the fundamental flaws of the U.S.-backed transition and the military's empty promise to hand over power to civilians.

Despite the reality of the situation, Washington continued to insist on referring to Sudan's transition as "civilian-led.” This delusion was evident in the 2019 transitional constitution, which stipulated that the military would lead for the first 21 months, followed by civilians for the next 18 months. Although Hamdok was a civilian prime minister, the role was largely powerless, and the military repeatedly delayed the handover date to civilians.

The U.S. and western governments may not have been able to prevent the 2021 coup against Hamdok, but their policies since then have certainly contributed to the ongoing violence in Sudan. The limitations of Western peacebuilding are evident. 

While the country's generals bear the primary responsibility for the current conflict, the root cause was a reconciliation agreement and security sector reform plan that the U.S. and the U.N. mission in Sudan had pushed. After the coup against Hamdok, the U.S. and the U.N. revived this plan, which meant reverting to a version of the flawed 2019 constitution and trusting the military leaders to keep their word.

In Sudan, a plan for security sector reform aimed to merge the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into one unified army. However, the size of each force remains uncertain, with estimates placing the SAF at around 100,000 soldiers and the RSF with a smaller standing army of 30,000 to 50,000 fighters, but with a large reserve force due to its ability to mobilize tribal allies.

Despite months of negotiations, the plan faced significant challenges due to the reluctance of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemeti to relinquish their power. The situation became increasingly tense, and the plan ultimately proved unsuccessful.

This outcome was not unforeseeable, in part because it mirrored similar agreements that were made in South Sudan in 2013 and 2016 – both of which ultimately led to civil wars.

Sharath Srinivasan's book “When Peace Kills Politics" sheds light on how international peacemaking efforts in Sudan and South Sudan have contributed to the occurrence of civil wars. Srinivasan argues that the ways in which peacemaking works can collide with the politics of a civil war, leading to a reproduction of violence.

In the case of Sudan's security sector reform, it created a competition that encouraged Hemeti and Burhan to strengthen their forces. However, the reform also required both men to be placed under civilian control, which was not in their interest. Despite publicly committing to reform and democracy, it appears that only U.S. and U.N. officials believed them.

This underscores the challenges faced by diplomats who have limited tools to stop the violence in Sudan. While the United States and other nations are promoting a humanitarian cease-fire, it has not been fully respected so far. Putting pressure on Egypt and the UAE would be crucial to avoid a regional conflict and to press for a humanitarian cease-fire so civilians can escape. 

An intense effort to evacuate U.S. citizens may come soon. However, once the current crisis is resolved, it will be necessary to examine how the U.S. and western policies failed to instigate Sudan’s democracy while effectively contributing to its collapse.