A dreamlike stillness pervades the Rif mountains of northern Morocco. If one takes the road east from the picturesque tourist destination of Chefchaouen, famous for the dazzling, sky-blue buildings of its old medina, one will likely meander through the sleepy, cedar-dappled valleys for hours without seeing another soul. This appears to be a place of serene, almost eerie quiet where nothing seems to puncture the calm.
But this appearance of uneventful tranquility is a paper-thin facade. In reality, the Rif is
the heart of a roaring cannabis trade, by far the largest in Europe and North Africa and among the most lucrative in the world. Morocco is the biggest supplier of cannabis and its byproducts to Europe, accounting for some 80 percent of all hashish smoked north of the Mediterranean.
In recent decades, the Moroccan government has faced growing calls to decriminalize the industry and make use of its enormous profits to boost the country’s economy. At long last, having for so long left it to criminal gangs to divide the spoils of the cannabis trade, the politicians are beginning to listen to these demands.
In May 2021, Morocco’s parliament approved Bill 13.21, decriminalizing cannabis production for medical and industrial use. The bill met with some significant opposition, but was backed by several key legislators, including the then Prime Minister Saad-Eddine El Othmani. The legislation was ratified on March 21, 2021 and passed in the Moroccan House of Representatives by 119 votes to 48.
While many have hailed the move as a step forward, the change of approach has brought enormous challenges. Regulating the industry is no mean feat: the bill unleashed what was described as a bureaucratic Tsunami, as the state is now charged with overseeing a market worth around $40 billion USD, involving some 800,000 workers.
The epicenter of the Rif’s cannabis trade is the town of Ketama, nestled deep in the mountains around 100 kilometers from Chefchaouen. According to government figures, some 116,000 acres of land are given over to cannabis production in the Rif. This industrial-scale operation has long been an open secret. While cannabis production was, until recently, completely illegal, law enforcement has long turned a blind eye to this most lucrative of trades. In the valleys around Ketama, where plantations stretch as far as the eye can see, the police are conspicuous by their absence.
Somewhat ironically, this compromise is set to change with the passing of Bill 13.21, as police units will (at least officially) be stationed in the Rif to oversee the newly decriminalized cannabis market. Following protests in recent years, the region is rife with political unrest and some fear that the regulations necessitated by Bill 13.21 will be used as a pretext for state crackdowns against vulnerable communities. Over 30,000 inhabitants of the Rif are subject to active arrest warrants and many of these individuals now fear for their livelihoods as law enforcement returns to the region. This is one of the reasons why many cannabis farmers reacted to Bill 13.21 with suspicion.
Farmers’ groups have long expressed dissatisfaction with the government’s treatment of those who work in the cannabis trade. Some have spoken of their frustration at not having been consulted during the drafting of Bill 13.21 and have expressed deep concern about the legislation’s contents. Many are worried that smaller, local cannabis producers will not be able to compete with the large multinational companies that will now enter the decriminalized market. Some farmers have argued that the new law will leave them poorer than ever before and that, in the areas of the cannabis trade that remain illegal, the exploitation of their communities by criminal gangs will only intensify. Given this context, Interior Minister Abdelouafi Laftit’s assurances that the new law would improve the lives of low-income farmers fell largely on deaf ears.
Many hold the view that the concerns raised by the Rif farmers cannot be met by partial decriminalization of the kind contained in Bill 13.21. They argue that what is required instead is the full decriminalization and regulation of the cannabis trade, including the production of cannabis for recreational use. While views on drug policy have evolved significantly in recent years, decriminalization often remains the elephant in the room, with a substantial proportion of policymakers around the globe still unwilling to question the underlying assumptions of the “war on drugs.” Yet in Morocco, growing numbers are coming around to the view that the government should go beyond Bill 13.21 and decriminalize cannabis altogether.
A 2020 report by Morocco’s Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE) found that the majority of Moroccans support the decriminalization of cannabis, with 86 percent saying that it would contribute to economic development. While the relatively small sample size of 1,054 may be too small to draw far-reaching conclusions, this decisive majority suggests general public support.
Advocates argue that, while partial decriminalization will yield significant profits for the state, full decriminalization would create much greater ones. A decriminalized cannabis market could not only be properly taxed, but would also bring international interest and with it the possibility of investment and development. Furthermore, decriminalizing the market would do away with the tremendous cost of the largely futile attempt to police the trade and the cycle of crime and violence it has created. It would also once and for all wrest the $40 billion Moroccan cannabis industry from the hands of criminal gangs, reappropriate their revenue for the public purse, and help tackle the myriad social ills that stem from the criminal underworld they inhabit.
Full-scale decriminalization would also potentially transform farmers’ revenue and living standards, principally because it would entail the decriminalization of processing marijuana into hashish, which remains illegal under Bill 13.21. A ton of unprocessed cannabis sold for industrial or medical use fetches around $700, whereas the same amount can be processed into around 12 kg of hashish and sold for around $3,500. This massive increase in profit would enable farmers to finally begin to reverse the tide of falling incomes and living standards that has plagued their communities for decades. A group of Rif farmers complained to Reuters that the money they bring in for producing a kilogram of hashish has fallen by a factor of six in the past decade. Such concerns simply cannot be adequately addressed in an illegal, unregulated industry.
Morocco’s parliamentary elections of 2021 ushered in a more progressive government that could, in theory, be expected to be more sympathetic to decriminalization and wider drug policy reform. Yet powerful international forces continue to push in the opposite direction. Morocco received $43 million from the United States between 2005 and 2012 to assist farmers in transitioning to alternative crops and €28 million from the European Union between 2003 and 2017 to assist in eradicating marijuana cultivation altogether.
At a time when policy and attitudes towards cannabis are changing rapidly around the world, the pressure on the Moroccan government to push beyond its current decriminalization stance will only increase. In the end, the astronomical profits that would flow from such a move will likely prove too enticing to ignore. How fairly those profits will be distributed remains to be seen.