“Are we Arabs or Africans?” This deceptively straightforward question about the Sudanese identity has haunted the country since independence from British colonial rule in 1956. Some have warned that unless Sudan manages its inherent diversity it could lead to the country’s disintegration and total loss. But few apart from the most pessimistic observer were expecting the situation to deteriorate as it did with the outbreak of war on 15 April 2023.

So what set this latest war apart from its predecessors, namely the Southern War, the Darfur War, the war in the Nuba Mountains, and the South Kordofan and Blue Nile War?

Unlike the previous wars, which you can tell from their names were prosecuted in specific geographical regions, the current war extends across the whole country. Prior theatres of war have been described by some analysts and politicians as marginal areas, in contrast to the northern, central, and eastern states and of course the capital Khartoum itself. Although this distinction is arguably an inaccurate one, it is nevertheless true that Sudan has not experienced a war that has touched all 18 states at the same time before. Some states have remained remote from direct confrontation in the field, but none have been spared attacks, for example by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) drones, which recently attacked power plants in Qadarif state, in eastern Sudan on the Ethiopian border, and in Northern State.  

The second difference is that previous Sudanese wars have been initially sprung from a sense of marginalisation in these so-called marginal states, resulting from unfair government spending and development and unmet regional demands. The 15 April War, however, was largely a result of a political dispute between two generals, the Army chief and head of the Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti”, over the implementation of a December 2022 framework agreement signed between the Army, the RSF and political forces. Tribal and regional factors only emerged later to fuel and perpetuate the fighting.

A third factor can be attributed to the sharp societal divisions which exist at city, village and community level. This author is among millions of Sudanese who can recall how, when the Southern Civil War broke out a second time in 1983, hundreds of thousands of south Sudanese were able to continue living in northern cities without being targeted on grounds of ethnicity. The situation today is undreamt-of in terms of the horrific scenes that have been circulating, such as the atrocities against members of the El Kanabi community when the Army retook Wad Madani, capital of Gezira State, in January 2025, after 13 months of RSF control.

It can be added that of all Sudan’s conflicts, and many of the seeds of war, and the effects of war, have led on to the next war, egged on by discourse in the media by the various parties to these conflicts.

Beginning with Torit

Sudan’s confrontations between the state and one or more ethnic groups started in August 1955, during the last months of colonial control. On the 18^th of that month, a Sudanese army garrison in the city of Torit in Equatorial State (now in Southern Sudan before secession) staged a mutiny, triggering the First Sudanese Civil War which lasted until March 1972, when former President Gaafar Nimeiri agreed to a peace deal with the rebel leader General Joseph Lagu.

The most prominent provisions of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement were to grant the right of self-government to the south, as well as respecting all religions and recognising the cultural characteristics of the people of the south.

Unfortunately, Sudan’s first three governments wasted 17 precious years by not recognizing these simple and legitimate requests reflecting the religious, linguistic, and cultural differences between the character of southern and northern Sudan (The north has a Muslim majority while in the south Christianity and African religions predominate; Arabic is spoken in the north versus African languages in the south, etc.). And, although the Addis Ababa Agreement managed to silence the guns temporarily, war returned to Sudan 11 years later.

Islamic rule

In September 1983, President Nimeiri announced the implementation of Islamic penal laws for theft, drinking alcohol and adultery. This coincided with the growing influence of Islamist elements allied with Nimeiri on the levers of power, with their long-time leader, Dr Hassan al-Turabi, playing a particularly powerful role.

With Nimeiri's announcement of the implementation of Sharia laws, the conflict in Sudan entered a new phase. Southerners added to their existing fears the possibility of becoming second-class citizens in their own country, a fear given credence by certain schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

Turabi-led Islamists seized power in a military coup against the government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi on 30 June 1989, which instigated another qualitative change in relations between northern and southern Sudan. After previous governments, both military-led and democratic, had viewed armed conflict in the context of a struggle between central authority and rebels forces, the new Islamist government under President Omar al-Bashir quickly recast it as a Jihadist struggle against the Infidel.

Evidence of this new approach was copious, but two innovations stood out from the rest. The first was a show on state TV called Sahat al-Fidaa (Fields of Sacrifice). It ran for many years and told stories of the heroic exploits of the mujahideen during the Southern War—mujahideen meaning the government forces fighting southern rebels during that period. The second was the establishment of a paramilitary force called the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), comprising Islamist fighters under the supervision of the well-known Islamist cadre Ali Ahmed Karti.

However, despite their Jihadist rhetoric, President al-Bashir and his Islamist cabinet ended up accepting the right of self-determination for South Sudan as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 2005.

Conflict in Darfur

Some two years before the CPA was signed, specifically in April 2003, armed movements in Darfur carried out their first major operation, destroying four aircraft at El Fasher airport and killing 32 government troops, including two officers. This operation is considered by many to be the real start of the war in Darfur.

It was a surprise to some that fighting moved from South Sudan to the Darfur region. North and south were divided by religion, language, culture and customs, whereas the main body of Sudan and Darfur share both religion and language, while cultural differences are much less than between north and south. The main split was between different tribes and ethnicities, along with the feeling that Darfur had been left behind economically compared with the rest of the country

The two main armed movements in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) are predominantly made up of African tribespeople who feel oppressed and marginalised by the ruling elites of the centre. These terms, centre, margins and elites are used extensively in their discourses.

The SLM, led by Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nur, of the Fur tribe, was secular and leftist, while the JEM was Islamist in nature. Its founding leader was Dr. Khalil Ibrahim from the Zaghawa tribe, a former ‘mujahideen’ member who fought alongside the Sudanese government in the South Sudan War

In response, the Sudanese government deployed forces that would become known as the  Janjaweed, who allegedly became the nucleus of the RSF. However, allegations of Khartoum’s reliance on these militias to confront the Darfuri groups is still a matter of dispute among observers. Some suggest that, when war broke out in Darfur, the Sudanese army was exhausted after two decades of fighting in the south. Others believe that the Sudanese government was intent on exploiting existing animosities between African and Arab tribes in Darfur; the majority of armed movement fighters belonged to non-Arab tribes, specifically the Zaghawa and Fur, while the Janjaweed forces and later the RSF consist primarily of Arab tribes in Darfur, especially the Rizeigat tribe, to which Hemedti, the commander of the RSF, belongs.

Some observers of Darfurian affairs believe these hostilities between Arab and African tribes in Darfur are partly due to disputes between pastoralists and farmers over cattle entering and destroying farms, as the majority of African tribes practise agriculture, while the traditional activity of Arab tribes in Darfur is pastoralism.

The geography of war

This brief historical account shows how the issues of identity, regional grievance and marginalisation have been central to Sudan's conflicts since before independence. However, they have returned to the forefront of political discourse since the outbreak of the 15 April War. The RSF claim to challenge the Sudanese ruling elite and have raised a banner against the State of ‘56, referring to the year of Sudan's independence, while the Army describes it as the “Battle of Dignity”. Both sides are seeking to garner legitimacy to justify the outbreak and continuation of the war, and these slogans have found adherents in a media environment in which racism, hatred, and rejectionism abounds.

For example, many pro-Army platforms on social media claim the majority of RSF members are not Sudanese, but hail from West African countries, referring to them as “Diaspora Arabs”. Meanwhile, pro-RSF platforms talk about the historical privileges that members of certain regions and tribes in the north and centre have received since independence in 1956.

In light of this polarization, the map of each side’s control over Sudanese territory matches what the media call the social and tribal “incubators” (hawaasin) of Sudan, namely that the Army controls northern and eastern states while the RSF controls large parts of the White Nile and Kordofan states and four of the five states of Darfur.

Regardless of the military changes that could take place and who will prevail in the end, the 15 April War has already left deep wounds in the social fabric of Sudan and the future of its national unity, that already faced many challenges before the outbreak of this latest round of internecine fighting.